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ORDER AND CHAOS: THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
Alfred P. Rubin* 
POINTS OF CHOICE. By Roger Fisher. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press. 1978. Pp. vi, 89. £ 1.95; $5.95. 
Points of Choice is the fifth and last of a series of mono-
graphs growing out of a study undertaken by the American 
Society of International Law on the role of international law in 
government decisions. Using the material of the previous mono-
graphs, which analyzed in some detail the use (and non-use) of 
the tools of international law by the statesmen involved in the 
Cyprus situation of 1958-1967, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, 
the Suez crisis of 1956, and the United Nations operation in the 
Congo during 1960-1964, and using some original examples as 
well, Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School argues 
strongly that a fuller appreciation by statesmen of. the power of 
international law to promote national goals, including the goal 
of a more stable international political environment, would be 
effective and to the benefit of us all. His argument is temperate, 
well documented, simply stated with lively examples, and should 
be overwhelmingly persuasive even to those whose conception 
of the international legal order is as primitive as they so often, 
and so wrongly, claim that order to be. He proposes two major 
practical recommendations: that attention to international legal 
implications should be built into the organization through which 
the United States government formulates foreign policy goals and 
tactics, and that the delicate tools of international law should be 
used realistically, with an eye to their limits as well as their 
strengths. On that level of generality, no one can seriously quarrel 
with his conclusions. 
On another level, Professor Fisher's conclusions are very 
much open to question. He amply documents instances in which 
America has failed to use the tools of international law to improve 
a negotiating position or a tactical political situation. He shows 
unmistakably that these failures are not the result of simple bu-
reaucratic mismanagement or policy-makers' questionable evalu-
* Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. B.A. 1952, 
J.D. 1957, Columbia University; M. Litt. 1963, University of Cambridge.-Ed. 
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ations of conflicting advice and nicely balanced interests. They 
are the result of what frequently seems to be a disregard of legal 
factors in decision-making. Such disregard directly affects Ameri-
can decisions that determine the immediate relations of the 
United States with all other states, and, somewhat less directly, 
it affects American tax rates, standards of living, and possibly 
even war and peace. It has more subtle effects too. On the most 
practical level, our foreign friends in their economic and political 
planning must calculate the reliability of the United States as a 
supplier of a stable currency in international exchange, an ad-
ministrator of a regime of passage through the Panama Canal, a 
partner in a defense treaty, a spokesman for human rights, in-
cluding rights of property, and in many other roles. The extent 
of that reliability is normally conceived to be reflected in formula-
tions of law; not only the law of treaties, but in canons of con-
struction found in international law just as canons of contract 
construction are found in national commercial law; not only in 
express promises to which the international legal order gives legal 
effect as treaties, but in a web of binding relationships giving 
stability to all international affairs and defining the distribution 
of legal powers to change those commitments in step with chang-
ing times and needs. On the record presented by Professor Fisher, 
the index of American reliability must be very low indeed. As a 
result, the world must be less safe for the investment of property 
and lives than it need be, and our share in what safety exists must 
diminish. Serious problems like this require serious remedies.· 
Professor Fisher's description of the problem and his pro-
posed remedies do not seem to be serious. Throughout the book 
the language of games appears: "The international order, legal 
and political, is a game in which the rules and institutions are 
constantly being revised as the game is played" (p. 39); "If all the 
other players are respecting the rules of the game, if the game is 
fair, and if not too much is involved in any one hand, a strong 
case can be made for reconciling the pursuit of victory with the 
pursuit of peace ... " (p. 78). "Games Theory" is useful. But 
carried to this extreme the game analogy, in my opinion, becomes 
part of the problem. It degrades the discussion by trivializing it. 
Real lives are involved, real standards of living, real (in some 
cases religious) convictions, and, however sporting the pursuit of 
peace and advantage may seem to some, it is not by any stretch 
of the imagination a game to others. It is amusing to refer to the 
interest of any "player" in winning each encounter, but in not 
winning all encounters, a witticism repeated in various forms at 
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least three times {pp. 61, 79, and 83) and which has a good deal 
of validity within the context of the American Department of 
Justice trying antitrust cases or state governments trying accused 
individuals; but it is hard to see how it applies in the interna-
tional arena where, as Professor Fisher points out, the issue is 
normally not whether one "wins" but how to keep the system 
("game"?) going in terms acceptable to all. The entire concept 
of winning games or encounters seems inconsistent with a serious 
approach to questions of life and death and the terms of survival. 
This trivializing approach is in fact the root of the problem. 
All who have thought the matter through, with or without the aid 
of Professor Fisher's book and the well-documented, indeed mag-
isterial, studies it rests on ( one of the authors was himself Legal 
Adviser to the Department of State during the crisis he analyzes; 
all have had substantial experience in the government and a 
learned and experienced panel of commentators to help polish 
their monographs), agree that a state's perceptive use of the tools 
of international law markedly improves its chances of achieving 
both short- and long-term goals in the international arena. While 
President Nasser's reliance on the tools of international law did 
not assure the success of his policy to take over control of the 
operation of the Suez Canal, it certainly improved his position; 
while President Kennedy's reliance on the forms of international 
law, including the treaty-based inter-American system, did not 
itself ensure the basically favorable resolution of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis of 1962, it certainly influenced politics and tactics in 
ways favorable to American interests. These successes are not 
trivial. Nor are the failures that result from ignoring the interna-
tional system. Many are cited in the book, and many suggestions 
are made as to how they could have been better handled. (To 
those who know Professor Fisher, it is clear that his suggestions 
are not mere hindsight, but the publication of ideas that he has 
expressed often before, frequently contemporaneously with the 
events he mentions.) The failures to achieve the practical results 
that would have been achievable through a knowledgeable appli-
cation of legal argument and the use of tactics geared to the 
niceties of the legal order result in compromises that do not re-
flect the full range of pertinent relationships among states. Thus 
the results are imbalanced even when on the surface more favor-
able to the United States than would likely have resulted from a 
fuller appreciation of the weaknesses of our legal position. Such 
imbalances are reflected in longer range instability growing out 
of resentments and evasions by the states and individuals who 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Order and Chaos 339 
feel their rights have been overborne. The instability is even more 
obvious when the failure to use the tools of the law results in a 
compromise on the surface less favorable to the United States 
than a fuller appreciation of the strengths of our legal position 
might have achieved. Worse yet, a display of legal ignorance, no 
matter what the immediate result or lack ofresult at the negotiat-
ing table, degrades the United States in many unquantifiable 
ways. It leads directly to the loss of prestige and of the capacity 
to influence future events (which Professor Fisher ·calls "power" 
for purposes of his monograph (p. 11)). Thus, the patent erosion 
of American capacity to influence events can be laid in part to 
failures to take seriously the tools that statesmen have at hand 
when pursuing national policy. These are losses of major propor-
tion. To give examples more recent than those cited in this mono-
graph, it cannot have gone unnoticed to the principal shipping 
powers of the world that the Panama Canal documents recently 
concluded between the United States and Panama disregard 
America's continuing legal obligations to Great Britain (and pos-
sibly to all Canal users) under the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty; 
it has surely not gone unnoticed in Taiwan that America's 
"acknowledgment" that Taiwan is part of China as far as Peking 
is concerned makes it difficult for the United States to adJust its 
policy should a true Taiwanese independence movement appear. 
These seeming fumbles are not trivial, nor are they best described 
in the language of game!:3. Such actions continued over time make 
it, as a practical matter, impossible for Egypt or Israel to accept 
American "guarantees" of a Middle East peace arrangement 
without American money to build military bases poised against 
each other. When we pay for such bases on both sides, not only 
is the cost excessive, but the return in the form of increased 
stability in the area may be illusory. 
Before turning to the best means of recovering America~s 
capacity to influence future events, it might be best to address 
briefly some common misapprehensions regarding international 
law. It is apparent from Professor Fisher's analysis that those 
misapprehensions exist at the highest levels of government in the 
United States and in the minds of many distinguished political 
scientists. 
It is apparent to Professor Fisher, as to most professionals in 
the field, that the international legal order is not "primitive" or 
crude in any way. It is a highly sophisticated legal system which, 
like American constitutional law, relies for enforcement upon po-
litical pressures more than court action. A more precise analogy 
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might be made to the British constitutional system. The British 
constitution is not a single document; it is contained in many 
documents of varying degrees of legal persuasiveness and in prac-
tices of varying antiquity. It is enforced by political pressures of 
varying degrees of subtlety without policemen (although some-
times by armies). Treaties are not analogous to statutes except 
in the same sense that ordinary contracts represent law for the 
contracting parties. It is the legal order-the distribution of legal 
powers and the full context of the system-that determines the 
legal force of promises; and they are binding whether or not en-
forceable by courts, just as a purchaser's warranty will normally 
be acknowledged by a respectable shop even though any particu-
lar customer is unlikely to bring suit when exchange of a shoddy 
article is refused. The general international law regarding claims 
has a close analogy to the common law of torts; like international 
claims, the vast majority of potential tort actions are resolved in 
this country with neither party seriously considering police or 
court actions, but with both parties genuinely grappling with the 
problems of any civilized society, in which competing interests 
must compromise their desires at least for a while, to reach a 
resolution with which all can live. 
In order to operate effectively within the international legal 
order, it is vital that it be perceived that there is such an order; 
that legal powers are distributed within it not solely on the basis 
of military or economic strength; that treaties are neither more 
nor less binding than some underlying law determines them to be; 
that rights of property are not "natural" but legal rights and are 
limited in the international sphere in ways analogous to the ways 
in which property rights are limited in all national law systems. 
The need for that fundamental perception of system and its basic 
tenets is routinely acknowledged within the Anglo-American legal 
order when we require all law students to study constitutional 
law, torts, contracts, and property. The need is no less for a prac-
titioner within the international legal order and is most impor-
tant when his client, whether a government or not, does not have 
the legal insight himself. 
This perception of system need not affect the lawyer's or 
client's political. orientation. Just as there are "liberal" and 
"conservative" private-law practitioners, there are able interna-
tional lawyers in government, private practice, and academia at 
all points of the political compass. Knowing the system does not 
necessarily mean that an international lawyer will support any 
particular legal policy-e.g., senatorial advice and consent to the 
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various human rights conventions-any more than all private-law 
practitioners will agree on any particular legislation or the desira-
bility of a client's committing himself to any particular contract. 
But knowing the system does mean that one's support or opposi-
tion is likely to be based on perceptions of short- and long-range 
interest influenced by cases and writings that reflect distilled 
experience and deep thought. And if all international lawyers 
agree, surely that fact alone should be significant to those making 
American policy, not only as a matter of common pru-
dence, but also because many foreign international lawyers hold 
positions of high influence in their own governments and their 
perceptions of American actions directly affect their own govern-
ments' policies. 
. The ability to function as an international lawyer is not rare. 
It is not often found among attorneys with no education or experi-
ence in international affairs, of course; it simply is not true that 
any good lawyer will function well as an international lawyer, just 
as it is not true that a good trial lawyer and a good municipal-
bond lawyer are necessarily cut from the same cloth. But many 
law schools offer fundament'al courses in international law, and 
a student's interest and some measure of ability (or, at least, 
speed in picking up the basics) can be gathered from the records 
of that experience. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
alone graduates one or two appropriately trained lawyers each 
year, both under a joint-degree program with Harvard Law 
School and otherwise, and the reservoir of young talent is ample; 
there are graduate schools and law schools all over this country 
training young lawyers of equivalent caliber in equivalent skills. 
Literally hundreds of qualified specialists in international law 
represent foreign and multinational clients, participate in panels, 
write articles, and join in the activities of the American Society 
of International Law and other professional associations. 
But as this is written, there is no one qualified in interna-
tional law on the staff of either the House of Representatives 
Committee on International Relations or the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations. The current Legal Adviser to the Depart-
ment of State is only the second since at least 1907 to hold the 
position of the United States' primary adviser on international 
law with no known background in that subject, and the first to 
show no interest in the American Society of International Law. 
How can the Congress or the Legal Adviser, without training or 
experience, judge whether a worthwhile contribution to policy 
can be made by those with such training? Professor Fisher's anal-
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ysis and the studies that preceded it clearly reveal that they have 
judged wrongly. 
Nor is this situation the result of a sophisticated decision by 
political scientists that there are better ways to perceive the inter-
national order than through laWYer's eyes. Amusingly, if not trag-
ically, Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University, in the 
most recent book on the subject, Primacy or World Order (1978), 
seems to misconceive the international legal order, but derives 
the same system through his own reasoning and perception as a 
political scientist. And the evidence of Professor Fisher's mono-
graph amply refutes any contention that American policy absent 
a serious consideration of international law is as effective as it 
would be if such consideration were given. 
In this deplorable situation, what is to be done? 
Professor Fisher proposes various steps to reorganize the han-
dling of international legal problems within the United States 
Government. Within the Department of State, he proposes the 
appointment of "at least one deputy whose full-time job would 
be ... [to] make certain that actions dealing with day-to-day 
crises took into account their impact on the international system" 
(p. 39). This proposal seems to be both too much and too little. 
Extra people are not needed because nobody with the job descrip-
tion of a lawyer-concerned-with-international-relations, even 
with the most petty technician's tasks in the office of the Legal 
Adviser, could do his job at a minimum competency level who did 
not routinely consider the impact on the international system of 
any proposal passing over his desk. There is no shortage of quali-
fied young lawyers, and more experienced lawyers within the of-
fice of the Legal Adviser can easily shoulder the supervisory re-
sponsibilities for which they are paid, to assure the competency 
of their immediate subordinates. To distinguish, as Professor 
Fisher impliedly does, between the need for a senior lawyer to 
perceive the international legal order and the supposedly lesser 
need for junior laWYers and the Legal Adviser himself, is to de-
grade the functions of the Legal Adviser's office and to assume 
that the Legal Adviser and his senior subordinates need not be 
well grounded in the expertise that is the main function of their 
jobs. The Legal Adviser is not the personal attorney of the Secre-
tary; he is the head of an office in the bureaucracy charged with 
supplying a kind of expertise that fits nowhere else in the govern-
ment's organization. If the Secretary feels he needs a technician 
in some other area of law, he can appoint a special assistant. But 
the Secretary himself is not a mere individual; he is a government 
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officer with public responsibilities. And his senior departmental 
staff is not a personal staff; it is a staff of "Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and . Consuls" which, by article II, section 2, 
clause 2, of the Constitution, cannot be appointed without the 
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. When an inappro-
priate or unqualified nominee is presented, it is the Senate's con-
stitutional responsibility to give advice and withhold consent. 
Professor Fisher's recommendation, therefore, ignores the consti-
tutional responsibilities resting on the Senate and the highest 
officers of our government. It is hard to see how his proposal can 
ameliorate a problem of incompetence for which responsibility 
rests with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Senate. 
Professor Fisher's other proposals, all of which amount to 
shifting out of the Department of State parts of the burden of 
inserting the expertise of international lawyers into the govern-
ment decision-making process, to the extent they are not them-
selves trivial seem to propose a cure that will not even alleviate 
the symptoms of the disease. One example that seems to incorpo-
rate most of the weaknesses of all of them should suffice to raise 
the issues: 
In my view, the 'act of state' doctrine ought not to be applied 
by the courts-or urged on them by the Executive Branch-to 
preclude judicial consideration of issues susceptible of resolution 
by reference to, for example, codified and customary principles of 
public international law. [P. 85] 
That very proposal was adopted by the Congress in the 1964 
"Sabbatino Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended, 1 with regard to claims of title or other right to prop-
erty based upon a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 
1959, by an act of a foreign state. The result of that action by the 
Congress has not been beneficial to the international legal order 
or the United States constitutional order. 
In 1964, Justice Harlan, speaking for an eight-to-one major-
ity of the United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino wrote: "There are few if any issues in interna-
tional law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the 
limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of al-
iens ... ," and added: "We do not, of course, mean to say that 
there is no international standard in this area; we conclude 
only that the matter is not meet for adjudication by domestic 
1. Pub. L. 88-633, pt. III, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (current version codified at 22 
U.S.C. §2370(e)(2) (1976)). 
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tribunals."2 The "act of state" doctrine was applied and the 
Cuban nationalization was granted legal effect with regard to 
property reaching the United States. 
In reaction, the Congress enacted legislation providing that 
"no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the 
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the mer-
its giving effect to the principles of international law" in such 
confiscation cases and set out what it asserted to be the relevant 
principles of international law, including one requiring "speedy 
compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, 
equivalent to the full value" of the property taken. 
But, as the Supreme Court had pointed out, those 
"principles" are not clearly principles of international law. In 
fact, the principles of international law are in dispute and many 
states disagree with the United States' negotiating position. It is 
that negotiating position, a mere "autointerpretation," that is 
now legislated as part of the United States' law; it is not necessar-
ily a generally accepted formulation of international law. 
And the legal power of the Congress to formulate negotiating 
positions for the United States and require them to be enforced 
as municipal law by American courts, while it has been upheld 
as constitutional in the particular case, raises serious constitu-
tional questions whose ultimate resolution is not at all clear. On 
the face of it, the same constitutional considerations that inhib-
ited the Supreme Court from adjudicating as a "domestic tri-
bunal" on the matter should inhibit the Congress from legislating 
on it or requiring an adjudication. It is the executive branch of 
our government that speaks for the United States in international 
forums where the rules of international law are hammered out; 
that compromises claims and bears responsibility for formulating 
the American legal argument when a foreign government com-
plains of the inadequate compensation we have offered following 
an American confiscation of foreign property here. Such cases 
have happened before3 and may certainly happen again. In these 
circumstances it is hard to see how the overruling of the act of 
state doctrine in a Sabbatino situation allows anything more than 
a rigid assertion of an argumentative American position by an 
American court in a case in which a foreign government will 
disagree as to the principles of international law that should gov-
2. 376 U.S. 398, 428 & n.26 (1964). 
3. See, e.g., Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States), 1 U.N. Rep. 
Intl. Arb. Awards 307 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922). 
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ern the case. Such a situation may strengthen a negotiating posi-
tion of a private American claimant in some cases, or even of the 
executive branch in some claims negotiations, but at the cost of 
the balanced give-and-take negotiation that is the basis for per-
suasive rule-formulation in the international legal order. 
Moreover, the implications should be examined of the escape 
valve the Congress left in the legislation when it provided that the 
executive branch might require the court, in disregard of the rest 
of the legislation, to apply the act of state doctrine when the 
President determines that that application is required in a partic-
ular case by the foreign policy interests of tl].e United States. It 
is hardly a justification for meddling with the constitutional dis-
tribution of responsibility within the federal government that the 
individuals saddled with a responsibility can get it back when 
they choose. If the President does nqt choose to make the appro-
priate determination, the Supreme Court would appear to have 
no alternative but to hold the Sabbatino Amendment unconstitu-
tional or to apply the Congress's version of the American position 
on a question of international law, to the potential embarrass-
ment of succeeding Presidents and the country as a whole. This 
hardly seems the way to enhance respect for the -international 
legal order in government decisions. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court is in many cases no willing 
recipient of responsibility with regard to international law. In a 
recent decision construing the act of state doctrine in a foreign 
confiscation situation, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic 
of Cuba,4 the Supreme Court split four to four, with the one 
"swing'' Justice expressing no opinion on the question whether 
the "act of state" doctrine could bar a recovery. The fo~r dissen-
ters invoked the Supreme Court's policy "of avoiding potential 
interference with the executive channels through which our na-
tion deals with others."5 The dissenters apparently felt that the 
executive's failure to act, and its willingness to pass the buck to 
the Supreme Court, did not relieve it of the constitutional respon-
sibility to resolve questions of international law by international 
correspondence and action. 
In these circumstances, it hardly oversimpli~ies Professor 
Fisher's argument to say that it attempts to saddle an unwilling 
and ill-equipped judiciary with a responsibility that constitution-
ally belongs to the executive branch, and that the latter's incom-
4. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
5. 425 U.S. at 737. 
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prehension of international law is hardly remedied by attempts 
to transfer its functions either to the Congress or to the judiciary. 
The simple answer to the organizational problem is to staff the 
executive branch so that it can fulfill its constitutional responsi-
bilities, starting by replacing the technicians in the office of the 
Legal Adviser of the Department of State-however competent as 
technicians, as lawyers in fields other than international and con-
stitutional law, or as political advisers-with competent interna-
tional lawyers. That is the conclusion that flows from Professor 
Fisher's analysis; his more moderate conclusions are not so mod-
erate as they are short-sighted or inappropriate to the problem. 
Professor Fisher has written a book summarizing a series of 
studies on the importance of international law to rational and 
perceptive decisions in international affairs. The book demon-
strates its thesis in measured tones and with many examples. The 
language of the exegesis, however, is taken from games theory and 
applied too literally, thus trivializing the problem. Professor 
Fisher's proposals to ameliorate the problem continue this trivial-
ization and seem inappropriate. But the problem itself is so 
clearly demonstrated and the truly ameliorative steps so obvious 
that the competence of national leadership in the area of foreign 
affairs can be measured by whether those steps are in fact taken. 
If not, our national leadership will have a great deal to answer for 
before the bar of history. 
